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Abstract. This study aims to analyze the effect of Insider Ownership, Institutional 
Ownership, Dispersion of Ownership, Debt to Total Assets, Collateralizable Assets, and 
Free Cash Flow on the Dividend Payout Ratio. These independent variables are proxies of 
agency costs. This study uses panel data of 90 non-financial companies in the period of 
2009-2011. The findings indicate that (1) All independent variables (Insider Ownership, 
Institutional Ownership, Dispersion of Ownership, Debt to Total Assets, Collateralizable 
Assets and Free Cash Flow) have significant effect on the dependent variable (Dividend 
Payout Ratio) simultaneously; (2) Institutional Ownership and Collateralizable Assets have 
a significant positive effect on Dividend Payout Ratio; (3) Insider Ownership, Debt to Total 
Assets, and Dispersion of Ownership have a significant negative effect on Dividend Payout 
Ratio; (4) Free Cash Flow has no significant positive effect on Dividend Payout Ratio. 
Keywords: ownership, debt to total asset, collateralizable asset, free cash flow, divide`nd 
payout ratio
Introduction
Capital market is a bridge to distribute 
welfare to the society, particularly to the 
holders of securities of a company, as 
stockholders will receive dividends and/
or capital gains. The amount of dividends 
depends on the amount of profits earned by 
the company and the Dividend Payout Ratio. 
Dividend Payout Ratio is a very important 
for financial managers, since it is associated 
with the distribution of profits, gained to 
stockholders in the form of dividends, and 
reinvested in the company in the form of 
retained earnings.
Based on the viewpoint of a financial 
management, a company’s goal is to maximize 
the prosperity of stockholders. This goal is 
often translated as maximizing the value of 
the company. In achieving this goal, many 
stockholders hand over the management 
of the company to a professional group 
classified as managers (agents). Managers 
appointed by the stockholders are expected 
to act on behalf of stockholders to maximize 
the value of the company in order to achieve 
the prosperity of stockholders. In managing 
the operation of the company, management 
(agents) frequently has hidden objectives in 
conflict with the main purpose of prospering 
stockholders, the so-called managers’ 
opportunism, i.e., to improve their welfare 
(status and salary), for example by having an 
expansion in the expense of imposing costs 
on the company.
Agency conflict frequently occurs 
between owners and managers about different 
viewpoints on dividends. Managers without an 
interest in dividends will be more concerned 
with individual goals by being opportunists. 
It will affect the dividends to be distributed. 
Agency conflict also occurs between managers 
and debt-holders. Managers prefer to have 
the retained dividends used as the capital 
to expand the company but the debt-holder 
prefers to have it used as funds to repay 
the debt of the company. The debt-holder 
concerns that the profit used for the expansion 
of the company is not as expected and the 
company cannot pay the debt.
The dispersion between the ownership 
and monitoring function within the financial 
function can result in the different level 
of interests/conflict called agency conflict. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
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the companies separating the functions 
of management and ownership will be 
vulnerable to agency conflict. To ensure that 
managers work for the benefit of stockholders, 
stockholders must pay the cost to monitor the 
activities of managers in order that managers 
can work in accordance with the interests of 
the stockholders. Monitoring is intended as 
a mechanism to align the interests involved. 
All costs incurred are called agency costs 
(Brigham, 2002, 2006).
Agency costs have a correlation 
with dividend payout ratio of a company. 
High agency costs can be a bad sign for 
stockholders. Stockholders will get low 
dividends because managers will use the 
funds in excess, resulting in the decrease of 
profit of the company.
This study aim to examine the effect 
of agency costs on dividend payout ratio 
of non-financial companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period of 
2009-2011. Non-financial companies are 
often sampled because of the availability of 
required data in detailed various financial 
ratios such as determinant of working capital 
(Fatimatuzzahra and Kusumastuti, 2016). 
Insider Ownership, Institutional Ownership, 
Collateralizable Assets, Debt to Total Assets, 
Dispersion of Ownership, and Free Cash Flow 
are proxies for agency costs. These proxies 
are consistent with the study by Mollah et al. 
(2000). From the study by Triani Pujiastuti 
(2008), debt is an additional variable.
Research Method
The population of this study is non-
financial companies listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange of 287 companies.  The Purposive 
sampling method is applied in this study to 
select 30 companies with the criteria of the 
availability of financial statement, presenting 
the necessary data related to the variables of 
the study. 
The approach used in this research is 
a quantitative approach. The data used in 
this research is secondary data in the form 
of annual financial statement data of non-
financial companies during the period of 
2009-2011 obtained from Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Observed from the aspect of the 
dimension of time, this study falls into the 
category of pooled data as well as time series 
and cross-sectional observations.
Research Variables
The dependent variable in this study 
is Dividend Payout Ratio, namely the ratio 
between dividend per share and earning per 
share (Mollah et al., 2000).
Dividend Payout Ratio=
The independent variable in this 
study is agency costs whose proxies are 
Insider Ownership, Institutional Ownership, 
Collateralizable Assets, Debt to Total Assets, 
Dispersion of Ownership, and Free Cash Flow.
Insider Ownership
Insider ownership is the percentage 
of shares owned by management. The 
management in question is the directors 
and commissioners actively participating 
in decision making. Insider ownership is 
symbolized with INSD (Mollah et al., 2000).
INSD=
Institutional Ownership
Institutional ownership is the number of 
ownership by the institutional investors from 
outside the company. The institutions are all 
parties in the form of private, governmental, 
and foreign institutions having shares in the 
company. This variable is symbolized with 
INST with a calculation according to the study 
by Putra (2006) as follows:
INST=
Collateralizable Assets
Collateralizable assets are the amount 
of assets that can be guaranteed by lenders 
to guarantee the loan. This variable is 
symbolized with COLLAS. According to the 
study by Mollah et al. (2000), it is the ratio 
of net fixed assets to total assets. This ratio 
is regarded as proxy of collateral assets for 
agency cost.
COLLAS=
Debt to total asset
Debt to total assets (DTA) is the ratio of 
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total debts, both current liabilities and long-
term debt, to total assets, namely current 
assets and fixed assets as well as other assets 
(Mollah et al., 2000).
DTA=
Dispersion of Ownership
Dispersion of ownership is measured 
using the variance of the data of the percentage 
of ownership. In this case, stockholders 
are considered as a group in which each 
shareholder represents one group. The 
formula used is as follows (Susilawati, 1999). 
Variance = 
Where X1 is the percentage of ownership 
of each group, X is the average percentage 
of ownership, and n is the number of data.
Free Cash Flow
Free cash flow can be simply translated 
as idle cash, namely the remaining cash after 
being used for various purposes of projects 
planned by the company, such as: paying 
debt, paying dividend, investing, and others. 
Free cash flow is represented by the ratio of 
free cash flow to total assets (Mollah et al., 
2000).
Analysis Model
In this study, multiple linear regression 
model is applied as follows:
DPR = b0 + b1 INSD + b2 INST + b3 COLLAS + 
b4 DTA + b5 DOWNER + b6 FCF + e
Description:
DPR  : Dividend Payout Ratio
INSD  : Insider Ownership
INST  : Institutional Ownership
COLLAS : Collateralizable Assets
DTA  : Debt to Total Assets
DOWNER : Dispersion of Ownership
FCF  : Free Cash Flow
bo  : Constant
e  : Error
b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6 : coefficient of changes in the 
value of each independent variable
Techniques of Data Analysis 
In this study, the analysis method used 
is multiple linear regressions using SPSS 
version 17, Eviews 07. This method is used 
to measure the effect of agency costs on 
dividend payout ratio. Furthermore, classical 
assumption test (Normality Test) is carried 
out. Panel data is tested using the Fixed Effect 
Model. Finally, hypothesis test is carried out 
using F-test, R2 Test, and t-test.
The Definition and Proxy of Agency 
Costs
According to Horne and Wachowicz 
(2005), agency costs are the costs associated 
with the monitoring of management to ensure 
that the management acts consistently in 
accordance with the contractual agreements 
of the company, the lenders, and stockholders. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
agency costs are the costs borne by 
stockholders to prevent or minimize the agency 
problems and to maximize stockholders. This 
study will focus on the agency costs whose 
proxies are Insider Ownership, Institutional 
Ownership, Collateralizable Assets, Debt to 
Total Assets, Dispersion of Ownership that 
affect the determination of Dividend Payout 
Ratio. 
Insider ownership is the ownership 
of shares by management. Thus, directly, 
management is the stockholders of the 
company. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain 
that the ownership of stocks by management 
will align the interests between management 
and stockholders. The similarities of interests 
between management and stockholders can 
reduce the potential of conflicts, and the small 
potential of agency conflict can influence 
agency costs incurred by stockholders.
Institutional ownership shall describe 
the level of ownership by an institution. 
Institutions in this case are the parties 
from outside the company in the form of 
institutions. The higher the percentage rates 
of institutional ownership are, the greater 
the monitoring by the institutional investor to 
managers is; hence reducing the opportunistic 
behavior of managers. Opportunistic behavior 
is the behavior frequently done by managers 
to take advantage of every opportunity to 
achieve personal gain. Monitoring managers 
can decrease the possible agency conflict. 
The lower the level of agency conflict on a 
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company is, the lower the agency costs are.
According to Mollah et al. (2000), 
a company owning high collateralizable 
assets has a small agency problem between 
management and lenders, leading to the 
decrease of agency costs. High collateralizable 
assets makes the lenders feel more secure 
and does not need to do a strict restriction on 
dividend payout ratio. Therefore, the company 
can pay larger dividends. On the other 
hand, low collateralizable assets owned by a 
company will increase the conflict of interest 
between stockholders and lenders, leading to 
the decrease of agency problem and agency 
costs. Low collateralizable assets trigger 
lenders to hinder the company from paying 
dividends in great amount to stockholders for 
fear that the company will not pay the debt 
(Sartono, 2001). 
Developing companies need a capital 
derived from debt or equity. Jensen (1986) 
argues that through the debt, the company 
has the obligation to make periodic payments 
of interest and principal. It can reduce the 
willingness of managers to use cash flow for 
less optimal activities. The existence of debt 
can force managers to enjoy less profit and 
work more efficiently. According to Sartono 
(2001), increasing funds with debt will reduce 
the scale of conflict between stockholders and 
management. It will decrease the agency 
cost.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) affirm that 
dispersion of ownership will lower the power 
of stockholders to monitor the management. 
Meanwhile, according to Roseff (1982), 
quoted by Moh’d, Perry and Rimbey (1995), 
the larger the number of stockholders is, the 
greater the dispersion of ownership and the 
more difficult the monitoring is, leading to 
more difficulties in performing the monitoring 
of the company. As a consequence, the 
dispersed stockholders can exploit the power 
of capital market to monitor the company by 
forcing to pay a higher dividend.
Free cash flow is the cash that can be 
distributed to lenders or stockholders, and is 
not required for working capital (Ross et al., 
2000). Such cash usually creates a conflict of 
interest between managers and stockholders. 
Managers want the funds to be reinvested 
in profitable projects. On the other hand, 
stockholders expect the remaining funds to 
be distributed to increase their welfare. 
Dividend Payout Ratio
According to Ang (1997), dividend 
payout ratio is the ratio between dividend 
per share and earning per share. According 
to Bambang Riyanto (1995), dividend payout 
ratio is the percentage of income that will 
be paid to stockholders as cash dividend. 
Dividend payout ratio (DPR) as the dependent 
variable essentially determines the portion 
of profits to be distributed to stockholders, 
and which will be retained as part of retained 
earnings (Jatmiko and Kusumastuti, 2017).
Dividend payout ratio determines the 
amount of profits divided in the form of cash 
dividends and retained earnings as a source 
of funding. This ratio shows the percentage 
of the profit paid to stockholders in the form 
of cash dividends. If retained earnings for the 
operational needs of a company are large in 
amount, then the profit to be paid as dividend 
is smaller. On the other hand, if a company 
prefers to distribute profit as dividend, it 
reduces the portion of retained earnings and 
internal funding source. However, choosing 
to distribute profit as dividend will obviously 
increase the welfare of stockholders in order 
that stockholders will continue to invest their 
shares in the company.
Analysis of Agency Costs on Dividend 
Payout Ratio
Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1. Sample of Descriptive 
Statistic
The result of descriptive statistics 
analysis shows that the number of observations 
(N) is 90, obtained from 30 companies in 3 
years. Figure 1 shows that Dividend Payout 
Ratio (DPR) has maximum value of 83.29% 
and minimum value of 6.5%, indicating 
that averagely companies have high level of 
distribution of dividend. Insider Ownership has 
the mean of 6.24%. It indicates that 6.24% 
outstanding shares are owned by directors 
and board of commissioners. The maximum 
value of 36.8% and the minimum value of 
0.004% show that averagely companies 
have low insider ownership. Institutional 
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Ownership has the mean of 66.79%. It 
indicates that 66.79% outstanding shares 
are owned by institutions of the companies. 
The maximum value of 98.97% shows the 
highest ownership, owned by one of the 
companies studied. The minimum value is 
12.3%. Dispersion of Ownership has the 
mean of 0.51400, meaning that the average 
of dispersion of ownership analyzed is low or 
owned by some groups only. The maximum 
value is 0.8875 and the minimum value is 
0.221. Collateralizable Assets has the mean 
of 31.21%. It shows that the average assets 
that can be guaranteed are 31.21%. The 
maximum value is 88.75% and the minimum 
value is 2.21%. Free Cash Flow has the 
mean of 0.060385. It shows that the average 
cash flow to total assets of the company is 
0.060385. It shows that the free cash flow is 
at low level. The maximum value is 0.198510 
and the minimum value is -1.989643. Debt 
to Total Assets has the mean of 23.731784, 
showing that the average proportion of debt 
to total assets in non-financial companies is 
23.731784. It can be considered small. Even 
though there are some companies with high 
proportion of debt to total assets, the amount 
is still considered small. The maximum value 
is 90.9240 and the minimum value is 0.1524, 
indicating that there is a significant difference 
between the maximum and minimum values. 
However, it is small because the average of 
the total is only 23.731784. 
Classical Assumption Test (Normal-
ity Test)
From the result of non-parametric 
statistical tests of Kolmogorov - Smirnov (KS), 
it can be seen that the value of Kolmogorov 
- Smirnov is 0338 and significant at 0.05 (for 
p = 0338> 0.05). It can be stated that the 
residuals are normally distributed.
Figure 2. The Result of Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Test
Panel Data Test
Figure 3. The Result of Regression 
with Fixed Effect Model
The result of regression using panel 
data test in Figure 3 shows that there are 
three variables of independent variables of 
agency costs affecting dividend payout ratio 
significantly, namely: Institutional Ownership, 
Collateralizable Assets, and Dispersion of 
Ownership because the significance level is 
below 5% and 10%, while Insider Ownership, 
Free Cash Flow and Debt to Total Assets have 
no significant effect because the value of the 
probability exceeds the significance level.
Figure 4. The Result of R2 and Adjusted 
R2
Based on Figure 4, the value of R2 for 
the entire sample is 0.469888 or 46.98%, 
meaning that 46.98% dividend payout ratio 
as the dependent variable in this model can 
be explained by variations in the independent 
variables, while 53.02% is explained by other 
factors outside the model. 
F-Stat Test
Based on Table 5, it can be described 
that the value of F-stat in the whole sample for 
this model is 12.85272 with 0 probability. This 
value is at the confidence level of 99% or highly 
significant. Therefore, Insider Ownership, 
Institutional Ownership, Collateralizable 
Assets, Debt to Total Assets, Free Cash Flow, 
and Dispersion of Ownership altogether affect 
Dividend Payout Ratio
Figure 5. The Result of F-stat and Prob 
F-stat
Based on Table 5, it can be described 
that the value of F-stat in the whole 
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sample for this model is 12.85272 with 0 
probabilities. This value is at the confidence 
level of 99% or highly significant. Therefore, 
Insider Ownership, Institutional Ownership, 
Collateralizable Assets, Debt to Total Assets, 
Free Cash Flow, and Dispersion of Ownership 
altogether affect Dividend Payout Ratio.
T-Stat Test
Figure 6. The Result of Regression with 
Fixed Effect Model 9
This test is carried out to determine 
the effect of each independent variable to 
the dependent variable using the significance 
level of 0.05 and 0.1 from the result of t-test, 
it can be explained as follows:
Insider Ownership
The result of the regression equation 
indicates that the coefficient for Insider 
Ownership is negative with the p-value of 
0.9356. It is not significant because p-value > 
α = 0.05. Therefore, based on the confidence 
level of 95%, Insider Ownership has no 
significant effect on Dividend Payout Ratio. It 
indicates that insider ownership is not able to 
explain the effect of dividend payout ratio to 
reduce the agency conflict. It is not in line with 
the study by Mollah (2007) stating that insider 
ownership has a significant negative effect 
on dividend payout ratio. The insignificance 
of insider ownership on dividend payout ratio 
indicates that insider ownership has a very 
small effect on dividend payout ratio. This 
study proves the substitution relationship 
between Insider Ownership and Dividend 
Payout Ratio. In other words, if the company 
establishes a large percentage of insider 
ownership, it will pay small dividend, while a 
small percentage of insider ownership will lead 
to large dividend payment. It is consistent 
with the study by Rozeff (1982). 
Institutional Ownership
Institutional ownership will describe 
the level of ownership by an institution. 
Institutions in this case are the parties from 
outside the company in the form of institutions. 
The result of regression equation shows the 
probability value of 0.0026. The p-value for 
Institutional Ownership is significant because 
p-value <α = 0:05 (0.0026). Therefore, based 
on the confidence level of 95%, Institutional 
Ownership has a significant effect on Dividend 
Payout Ratio.
It suggests that large institutional 
ownership in a company can reduce the 
opportunistic action of managers. Opportunistic 
action is often done by managers to take 
advantage of each opportunity to achieve 
personal gains. It is consistent with the study 
by Mollah (2007) as well as Bathala et al. 
in Putra (2006), stating that the ownership 
by institutions can serve as a monitoring 
for reducing agency costs. The party of 
institutional ownership has a desire to get 
the profit from the company in the form of 
dividend.
Collateralizable Assets
Collateralizable assets are the amount 
of assets that can be guaranteed by lenders 
to guarantee the loan.  It indicates that 
collateralizable assets are able to explain 
the dividend for reducing agency conflict. 
It is consistent with the study by Mollah 
(2000) stating that collateralizable assets 
have positive and significant effect. High 
collateralizable assets owned by a company 
will reduce the conflict of interest between 
stockholders and lenders, in order that 
the company can pay large dividend. Low 
collateralizable assets owned by a company 
will increase the conflict of interest between 
stockholders and lenders. Therefore, lenders 
will hinder the company from paying large 
dividend to stockholders for fear that the 
company will not pay the debt.
Debt to Total Assets
Debt to total assets in this study is 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
describing the burden of assets on the debt 
ratio of the company. The result of statistical 
test by t-test shows that Debt to Total Assets 
has the probability value of 0.1080. It is 
not significant because p-value > α = 0:05. 
Therefore, based on the confidence level of 
95%, Debt to Total Assets has no significant 
effect on the Dividend Payout Ratio. 
It is because the amount of debt does 
not affect the management policy to pay 
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dividends. Thus, it is consistent with the study 
by Sunarto and Andi Kartika (2003). 
Dispersion of Ownership
Dispersion of ownership is the number 
of shareholders of a company. In this study, 
it consists of several groups of shareholders. 
The result shows the probability value of 
0.0876. It is significant because p-value > α 
= 0:05. Therefore, based on the confidence 
level of 95%, Dispersion of Ownership has 
no significant negative effect on Dividend 
Payout Ratio. However, at the significance 
level of 0.1, Dispersion of Ownership has 
a significant effect. It is consistent with 
the study by Mollah (2000) stating that 
Dispersion of Ownership has positive effect 
on Dividend Payout Ratio. Mollah states that 
dispersion of ownership is a determinant 
that can be accounted for in dividend payout 
ratio in reducing agency conflict. The larger 
the dispersion of ownership is, the greater 
the amount of dividends distributed is. With 
dispersion of ownership, ownership is not 
merely concentrated on particular group. It is 
possible that the owner is an institution having 
a power to convey aspiration to management. 
Thus, to reduce agency conflict, management 
will provide large dividends. 
Free Cash Flow
Free cash flow is required to finance 
projects with positive value when discounted 
at the relevant capital costs. Free cash flow 
reflects the flexibility of the company to 
carry out additional investments, pay debts, 
or increase liquidity. The result shows the 
probability value of 0.1841. It is significant 
because p-value > α = 0:05. Therefore, 
based on the confidence level of 95%, Free 
Cash Flow has no significant positive effect 
on Dividend Payout Ratio. It indicates that 
free cash flow is not able to explain the effect 
on dividend payout ratio to reduce agency 
conflict. 
Conclusions
The hypothesis test regarding the effect 
of agency costs on dividend payout ratio 
has less probability value of the determined 
significance level. Therefore, the regression 
model proposed is appropriate to be used 
to see the effect of independent variables 
(agency costs) on the dependent variable 
(dividend payout ratio) according to the 
hypothesis. The result of partial test shows 
that Institutional Ownership, Dispersion of 
Ownership and Collateralizable Assets have 
significant positive effect on Dividend Payout 
Ratio, while Insider Ownership, Debt to Total 
Assets have no negative effect on Dividend 
Payout Ratio. Free Cash Flow has no positive 
effect on Dividend Payout Ratio.
This study is limited only within a period 
of 3 years (2009 to 2011) due to the limitation 
of the sample, should the number of periods 
be increased. Therefore, further studies can 
add or extend the period of the study. The 
longer period of study will be able to better 
explain the consistency of the effect of agency 
costs on dividend payout ratio. Future studies 
should use other variables or proxies of 
agency costs or use more variables capable to 
demonstrate a real effect on dividend payout 
ratio, such as firm size and growth (Smith and 
Watts (1992) in Fajar (2010)).
References
Fatimatuzzahra, Mias and Retno Kusumastuti. 
(2016). Determinant of Working Capital 
Management in Manufacturing Companies, 
MIMBAR, Vol. 32, No. 2.
Jatmiko, Indra, and Retno Kusumastuti 
(2017). Ownership Structure and Dividend 
Policy in Non-Financial Company, MIMBAR, 
Vol. 33, No. 1.
Jensen, M.C. (1986). The Agency Cost of Free 
Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Take 
Over, American Economic Review (May), 
pp. 249-259.
Jensen, M. C. and W.H. Meckling. (1976). 
The Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior 
Agency Costs and Capital Structure, 
Journal of Financial Economic. October, 
Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 305-360.
Mollah, A Sabur., Rafiq, R.B. and Peter, A. 
Sharp. (2007). Relevance of Agency 
Theory for Dividend Policy in an Emerging 
Economy: The Case of Bangladesh, The 
Legal Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 13.
Mollah, A. Sabur., Keasey and Short. (2000), 
The Influence of Agency Costs on Dividend 
Policy in an Emerging Market: Evidence 
from The Dhaka Stock Exchange, Journal 
of Financial Research, Paper presented of 
workshop at the University of Oslo.
Pujiastuti, Triani. (2008). Pengaruh Agency 
Cost terhadap Kebijakan Dividen pada 
Perusahaan Manufakur dan Jasa yang Go 
Public di Indonesia, Jurnal Keuangan dan 
Perbankan, Vol. 12.
266 ISSN 0215-8175  |  EISSN 2303-2499
AMY NATALIA, ET ALL.  An Analysis Of Agency Costs And Dividend Payout Ratio Of Non-...
Putra, I Nyoman Nugraha Ardana (2006). 
Analisis Biaya Keagenan terhadap 
Kebijakan Dividen pada Perusahaan 
Manufaktur yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek 
Jakarta, Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Vol. 5, 
December 2, pp. 37-47.
Sartono, A. (2001). Long Term Financing 
Decision: Views and Practices of Financial 
Managers of Listed Public Firms in 
Indonesia, Gadjah Mada International 
Journey of Business, Vol. 3, pp. 35-44.
Riyanto, Bambang. (1995). “Dasar-dasar 
Pembelanjaan Perusahaan”, Yogyakarta: 
BPFE UGM.
Ross, S.A. (2000). “Fundamental of Corporate 
Finance”, Standard Edition, Boston: Irwin 
McGraw-Hill.
Roseff. (1982). Growth, Beta and Agency 
Cost as Determinant of Dividend Payout 
Ratios, Journal of Financial Research, pp. 
249-259.
Indonesia Stock Exchange. (2009), (2010), 
(2011). Financial Statement.( www.idx.
co.id) Retrieved on March 2013.
